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Two themes run consistently throughout Terrorism: Roots, Impacts, Re-
sponses, edited by Lawrence Howard, and Western Responses to Terrorism, edited 
by Alex P. Schmid and Ronald D. Crelinsten. Both themes serve to highlight the 
highly emotional public response and debate surrounding terrorism, while also 
pointing to some of the primary sources of difficulty associated with efforts to reach 
a consensus on either the definition of terrorism or the selection of appropriate 
responses. Central to the discussions presented in Terrorism and Western Re-
sponses is the question of legitimacy. Before terrorism can be defined, and before 
the most appropriate responses can be identified, observers, analysts, and policy 
makers must decide on the degree of legitimacy they are willing to afford terrorists. 
Failure to define the extent to which acts of terror can be viewed as justified within 
the context of political struggle prevents meaningful consensus on response. For 
democracies, the importance of determining legitimacy becomes even more critical 
given the emphasis placed on the rule of law and respect for rights in those societies. 
Efforts to determine the degree of legitimacy a government is willing to cede, 
in turn, impact significantly on the state's willingness to relinquish elements of 
sovereignty. By recognizing the legitimacy of political offenses, the state is forced 
to balance varying standards of acceptable behavior using an artificial situational 
context to differentiate between justified and unjustified uses of force. Society 
demands protection from unanticipated violence against the innocent. Allowing for 
the legitimacy of acts committed in the context of political activity disregards those 
generally accepted standards of society. At the same time, international efforts to 
coordinate and integrate policies and actions into a common set of responses 
appears most likely through integration of law enforcement and judicial activities. 
Common responses, if effective, will require international consensus on the 
definition of "terrorism," the nature of "political offenses," the degree of legitimacy 
afforded to those pursuing violence as a form of political struggle, and the degree 
to which each participating state is willing to cede measures of state sovereignty to 
itspartners. 
Each volume stands well on its own, displaying its own set of strengths. 
Terrorism highlights the broader, more intangible theme of terrorism's legitimacy 
and that question's impact on crafting a successful response. Western Responses, 
on the other hand, focuses on developing a model for a common European response, 
addressing mainly the question of shared judicial and police policies and their effect 
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on the tangible goal of identifying that model. In this light, Western Responses 
addresses the concrete aspects of the response problem. Taken together, the two 
volumes bring the reader through the full range of considerations, allowing for a 
more considered appreciation of the difficulties inherent in creating an effective, 
and acceptable, response to terrorism. While each has its own particular strengths 
and weaknesses, like any other work in a field so intimately tied to values 
judgments, the volumes compliment each other well and are best read together. 
The notions of legitimacy and sovereignty form an underlying basis of both 
Terrorism and Western Responses. Terrorism originated as publicly presented 
lectures given at the University of California, Irvine in 1989 and 1990. Howard's 
contributors were asked ". . . to address the casual background (the roots) of 
terrorism and the impact on various audiences and institutions and to suggest 
responses that they believe should form the basis of public policy." (p. ix) 
Acknowledging that terrorism affects different audiences in varying ways, Howard 
points out that for Americans, his contributors' primary audience, terrorism remains 
primarily a symbolic threat. Given the relatively small numbers of Americans killed 
or injured by terrorist violence, especially when compared to the numbers killed or 
injured as the result of traffic accidents or lightning strikes, Terrorism serves to 
illustrate the prejudices and fears generated by terrorist violence. These, Howard 
points out, can contribute to the terrorists' success. Since public reaction magnifies 
the terrorists' goals of riveting public attention, Howard argues terrorism may, in 
a sense, be effective. This observation raises, for Howard, the central question 
addressed by his contributors: should we acknowledge any legitimacy in terrorism? 
Brian Jenkins begins to tackle the question by examining broadly defined 
ways in which democracies should respond to terrorism and how terrorism itself 
impacts on those democracies. While recent trends in terrorist violence have led to 
increased deadliness, Jenkins points out that terrorists have been aided as well by 
more widely available weapons and explosives, greater global mobility, and 
advances in mass communications. Communications advances are reinforced by 
the media's tendency to devote more attention to the dramatic, yet the terrorists 
themselves have tempered those advances by their inability to effectively commu-
nicate their political message in a simple, easily understood manner free of 
confusing and pedant rhetoric. In arguing that democracy itself is perhaps the 
strongest weapon available to counter the threat, Jenkins points out that emotional 
public reactions often lead to emotional government responses which can be taken 
as a reward for terrorist violence in the absence of any real terrorist-to-government 
dialogue. Overtly emotional responses, such as military retaliation, have little place 
in Jenkins' vision of appropriateness. Besides conveying a form of legitimacy 
through dialogue, military retaliation is seen as inappropriate since 
[t]errorists offer few targets for conventional military operations. 
They control no territory and have no cities or populations to protect. 
States that sponsor terrorism are more vulnerable to military violence, 
but we must have evidence that connects the state to the act of 
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terrorism — and that is hard to get. For example, the Japanese Red 
Army leader shows up in Tripoli and vows to take revenge for the 
bombing of Libya; attack follow in Europe. They may have a base in 
Lebanon or maybe Damascus. What do you attack? (pp. 22-23) 
Jenkins, however, falls into the common trap of viewing the phenomenon from 
a narrow perspective by asserting that international terrorism is a uniquely 
American concern. 
Christon Archer, a professor of history and the chairman of the Department 
of History at the University of Calgary, examines the period leading to Mexican 
independence in searching for antecedents to today's terrorism. Looking at the 
years 1810 to 1821 and the actions of both the Mexican rebels and the colonial 
Spanish authorities, Archer illustrates the commonalities in tactics both between 
Mexicans and Spaniards and between those two groups and today's terrorists. 
While providing a well written overview of the struggle for Mexican independence, 
Archer's greatest contribution to Terrorism lies in highlighting the common 
elements of political violence found in both early nineteenth-century Mexico and 
today's international arena. In the final analysis, Archer succeeds in demonstrating 
that the very elements which make terrorism abhorrent today are not unique to the 
twentieth century. 
While terrorist violence, as Archer points out, is not new, we often tend to 
focus on particular groups or ideologies we associate with terror. These associa-
tions are generally fleeting and firmly grounded in the attention and publicity of the 
most recent deadly series of attacks. This tunnel vision, in turn, leads easily into the 
type of stereotype attacked by Khalid Duran. An Associate Scholar at Philadel-
phia's Foreign Policy Research Institute, Duran examines the current popular 
association of terrorism with Muslim extremism on the one hand, and contrasts 
these with the tenets of the Koran on the other. Demonstrating an intimate 
understanding of the Koran, Duran points out that despite popular perceptions and 
despite the claims of some Middle Eastern terrorists, the Koran specifically forbids 
the use of violence in pursuit of political goals, effectively negating the claimed 
religious legitimacy of some Middle Eastern groups. He further argues that the true 
roots of Middle Eastern terrorism can be found in anti-colonial struggles, the 
Palestine question, wealth disparities, and in authoritarian states which cynically 
invoke Islam for their own ends. Duran cites European fascism, communism, and 
the success of Jewish terrorists in Mandate Palestine as inspirations for Middle 
Eastern terrorists. The examination suffers in the end, however, in Duran's fairly 
weak attempt to demonstrate his view that Middle Eastern terrorism pales when 
compared to Iranian terrorism which, in turn, pales when compared to that 
perpetrated by Pakistan. In this argument, Duran has his greatest difficulty 
separating Pakistani internal security and foreign policies, particularly toward 
Afghanistan, and their relationship to terrorism. Arguing that Pakistani policy 
centers on the absorption of Afghanistan as a means to provide strategic depth 
against India has little demonstrated link to terrorism. While Duran may have valid 
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points to make, his argument lacks the evidence and compelling construction 
necessary to successfully make his point. 
Martha Crenshaw moves the examination toward the psychological 
motivations which allow for indiscriminate violence. Crenshaw argues well that 
much can be learned about terrorist motivations by thoroughly examining strategic 
and political aspects of terror, but mat to understand a group such as ETA requires 
psychological analysis at both the individual and group levels. Strategic and 
political analysis often tends to suggest that groups granted some of their demands, 
particularly those associated with access to the political process and a chance to 
affect political change through non-violent means, are likely to give up violence at 
least as long as the changes appear to be working. The ETA however, is one group 
which has refused to renounce or refrain from violence despite political reforms 
implemented after the death of Generalissimo Francisco Franco. Something else, 
either at the group or individual levels, Crenshaw argues, motivates these individu-
als and the most likely weak point lies in the strength of the group's cohesiveness. 
Crenshaw argues that psychological analysis will likely provide the information 
most useful in breaking that cohesion. Military retaliation, on the other hand, could 
serve to further motivate the group by reinforcing feelings of common struggle 
against an unyielding opponent. 
Nehemia Friedland, an associate professor of psychology at Tel Aviv 
University, adds to Crenshaw's assessment by seeking to construct a framework for 
understanding motivations toward violence based on socio-psychological axioms. 
Friedland sees three generalizations as the basis for such a framework, beginning 
with the idea that terrorism is a group phenomenon. This categorization eliminates 
much of what is often labelled terrorism by the mass media, such as attacks 
conducted by lone individuals with or without a political agenda. However, this 
narrower focus does not represent a weakness in Friedland's analysis. Secondly, 
intergroup conflict provides the genesis for terrorism, although here Friedland 
clearly refers to the terrorists and the state or society they attack as the groups in 
conflict. Friedland seeks to clarify this generalization by arguing that terrorism's 
roots in intergroup conflict negate individual psychosis or personality disorders as 
identifiable root causes of terrorism. Finally, terrorism conducted by non-state 
actors is a weapon of the weak who feel, correctly or incorrectly, that they have no 
alternative to violence in their struggle. Viewing terrorism as intergroup conflict 
between the terrorists and the larger society, Friedland raises three questions for 
which answers are needed when seeking insight into the causes of terrorism. First, 
what are the conditions that produce a movement toward social and political 
change? Next, what are the dynamics that turn such a movement to violence? 
Finally, why has terrorism acquired unprecedented dimensions in the last two 
decades? (p. 83) 
Alex P. Schmid, as a contributor to Terrorism, addresses Friedland's third 
question in his 'Terrorism and the Media: Freedom of Information vs. Freedom 
from Intimidation." Schmid argues that terrorism is violence directed toward 
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exploiting the power of the media. Revolving around the question of whether the 
media "by informing us on acts of terrorism, [does] not also intimidate all those who 
own a radio or TV set or read a paper and identify with the victim...." (p. 95) Schmid 
sees the media as a tool for terrorists, arguing that terrorists often engage in acts of 
violence as a means of securing odierwise ordinarily denied access. The impact as 
Schmid points out, both in timeliness and reach, of the mass media today lend even 
greater weight to the notion of killing one to frighten ten thousand.1 (p. 99) Schmid 
makes some good points, but falters in assessing the point of blame. While he 
accurately reflects the media's impact in allowing terrorists access to many more 
individuals than they might odierwise have, providing an outlet for spreading their 
message of fear and intimidation, he comes up short in maintaining that "[i]n a 
certain sense, we are all victims of terrorism as is constructed for us by the mass 
media...." (p. 101) The media does seem to focus shallowly on the violence itself, 
often not addressing in any depth the causes, impacts, or responses; yet by asserting 
that the media's treatment of terrorism serves to victimize entire societies it denies 
die individual's ability to simply ignore the media and message. Newspapers and 
newsmagazines can go unread, and TVs and radios can be turned off, removing the 
terrorists' ability to reach mose individuals wiüi their message. For those individu-
als who do allow die intrusion of the media, however, Schmid's assessment remains 
valid, particularly witii respect to a government's desire to counter or contain 
adverse emotional impacts of acts of terror. Toward tiiis end, Schmid advocates 
media self-censorship, radier than governmental censorship, as a means of denying 
terrorists die outlet tiiey need for die public attention. 
Howard uses Abraham Miller's examination of Britain's "Guildford Four" 
case to highlight and expand upon the idea mat media self-censure provides a more 
reasonable alternative to government censorship. Miller, a professor of political 
science at me University of Cincinnati, provides a very readable account of Gerard 
Conlon' s arrest and conviction in British courts for bombing a pub in Guildford, and 
of me injustice done to Conlon and his codefendants as a result of tiieir false 
conviction and imprisonment. Miller demonstrates in this case how die British 
criminal justice system failed by allowing convictions based on suspect allegations 
of one individual and subsequent interrogation by British police. Beyond the claims 
of police beatings and other forms of mistreatment to obtain confessions, Miller 
illustrates the British courts' failure to conduct itself in die manner British society 
generally expects, by refusing to reconsider the guilty verdicts in light of evidence 
obtained later, which clearly pointed to die guilt of otiiers. Miller turns around 
Schmid's arguments, in a sense, and seeks to demonstrate how a democratic 
government can persecute innocents in the name of preserving national security, 
and how only a free and persistent media can save tiiose people. Miller demonstrates 
how persistent media pressure eventually forced British autiiorities to reconsider 
the conviction and imprisonment of Conlon and others. Miller argues, perhaps 
correctiy, that witiiout this pressure from an uncensored media, the Guildford Four 
would remain incarcerated in Britain. Miller's presentation is compelling, yet his 
analysis seems to present the actions of separate British authorities at various levels 
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in the local and national bureaucracies as coordinated actions fitting into a plan 
to protect British society from Irish Republican Army terror at any cost. A more 
balanced approach would also include the possibility that sloppy police work, 
coupled with a bureaucratic obsession with IRA terrorism at the time, led to an 
environment in which abuses were possible. Seeing the experience of the 
Guildford Four as the result of such a time, rather than as a planned course of 
government action, would more accurately illustrate the dangers faced by democ-
racies when the level of political violence rises to the point that the citizenry 
demands decisive action. 
The future of terrorism and guerrilla warfare, particularly when it concerns 
US policy makers, is the concern of Bruce Hoffman's contribution to Terrorism. 
While Hoffman makes many good points and generally argues those items well, the 
overall tenor of his treatment is disappointing, due largely to his failure to clearly 
define terms. Hoffman states that there were "[o]nly thirteen identifiable terrorist 
groups . . . in 1969, for example, compared with seventy-four today," (p. 141) 
without setting parameters by which he arrived at those numbers. His treatment 
suffers a similar fate when he discusses religion-inspired terrorism. Asserting that 
this form of terrorism has occurred throughout history, Hoffman continues by 
arguing that religion-inspired terrorists: 
. . . perform their terrorist acts for no audience but themselves. Thus 
the restraints on violence that are imposed on secular terrorists by the 
desire to appeal to an uncommitted constituency are not relevant to the 
religious terrorist, (p. 145) 
Hoffman continues by arguing that secular and religious terrorists, consequently, 
see themselves differently, with religious terrorists motivated more by a sense of 
alienation and secular terrorists by a more pragmatic desire for system change. 
Despite the difficulties Hoffman encounters through lack of definitional clarity, he 
makes some interesting and relevant points for American policy makers. 
Hoffman begins to bring Terrorism back to the question of appropriate 
response by arguing that the United States should not shy away from using military 
force to counter terrorism, particularly when the terrorist violence is state-spon-
sored. In highlighting the pressures to react felt by political leaders, even if the mood 
favors blind retaliation, Hoffman argues that the use of force should be carefully 
calculated to send a message to the terrorist leadership, or their sponsor's leadership, 
while limiting collateral damage to the greatest possible extent. Like Jenkins in 
chapter one, Hoffman argues for a measured and well-thought out course of action 
if military response is selected by policy makers. 
Paul Wilkinson's first contribution, "Observations on the Relationship of 
Freedom and Terrorism," continues drawing the threads of Terrorism to a conclu-
sion by discussing the strengths of democratic institutions against terrorist assault. 
Wilkinson points out the human impulse toward political freedom and suggests that 
in many instances these impulses highlight the irresistible allure of democratic 
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institutions. Wilkinson illustrates his point by arguing that as Eastern Europe 
experiences greater political liberalization, it will also face a greater threat from 
insurgent terrorism. This threat, in turn, will increase pressure on those govern-
ments to fall back on authoritarian means of suppression. The preferred alternative, 
Wilkinson counsels, is to reign in the impulse to reinstitute draconian state controls 
and to counter the threat through the strength of democratic institutions lest the gains 
of liberalization are lost. 
Wilkinson's second contribution to Terrorism, "Can the European Commu-
nity Develop a Concerted Policy on Terrorism?" not only brings Howard's edition 
to closure, but provides a bridge to his more in-depth examination of that topic in 
Western Responses. In Terrorism, Wilkinson briefly examines the prospects of 
greater European economic and political integration in terms of the impact on 
counter-terrorism efforts. He argues that a common legal policy would strengthen 
Europe's ability to meet and withstand terrorist challenges ahead. Western 
Responses, in turn, fleshes out in greater detail the challenges and opportunities 
faced by European policy makers as Europe moves toward greater integration. 
Alex P. Schmid and Ronald D. Crelinsten put together Western Responses 
to stimulate discussion on European responses to terrorism. Recognizing that 
countries such as Israel and the United States have developed certain anti-terrorist 
policies, Schmid and Crelinsten seek to address the need or desire for a common 
Western European response model. Given increasing European integration, they 
ask which, if any, present Western European national model is most appropriate for 
the future. If no present national model is suitable, they continue, is a new approach 
possible which combines the effective elements of others while preserving demo-
cratic acceptability? The editors stress their perspective, and bias toward preserving 
their conception of liberal democracy, by concluding the introductory remarks: 
With these profound and dramatic changes [increasing European 
integration as well as changes in the international environment] has 
come a transformation of terrorism and political violence in general. 
The increasing importance of religiously-inspired, right-wing, na-
tionalist or anti-foreign violence and the increasing recognition, as 
highlighted in many contributions to this volume, that domestic and 
international forms of terrorism are often closely connected, necessi-
tate a rethinking of traditional approaches both to the study of 
terrorism and to its control by democratic states. 
By looking back over the past two and a half decades of terrorism 
when a new era in international affairs is just beginning, we hope that 
this volume will serve to highlight the need to rethink traditional 
concepts of both terrorism and counter-terrorism and to develop new 
approaches for the democratic control of terrorism in a rapidly 
changing world, (p. 6) 
The goals are admirable, yet Western Responses carries with it several 
shortcomings. Foremost among these is the evident bias in some of the selections 
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toward protection of the rights of those convicted of terrorist violence. Democ-
racies do have a duty to protect and maintain the rights of individuals, yet when 
that desire conflicts with anti-terrorist practices to the detriment of society, one 
has to wonder whether the needs of society are being well served. It should be kept 
in mind that terrorists guilty of violence against society have, themselves, broken 
the rules society has established for itself. By stepping outside the bounds of 
accepted behavior, the terrorist effectively relinquishes any claims to legitimacy. 
Excusing his actions through justifications based on the political nature of the act 
serves only to raise the relative importance of the terrorist's rights above those of 
the greater society. 
Western Responses also suffers, through no fault of the editors, from some 
rather sketchy treatments of specific country models. Schmid and Crelinsten 
organize the volume into three sections examining, in turn, the problem under 
discussion, specific national European experiences with terrorism, and a discussion 
of what lessons can be drawn from the foregoing. Western Responses has its genesis 
in a 1989 conference organized by the European student association AEGEE 
(Association des États Généraux des Étudiants de l'Europe), with participation 
from the Center for the Study of Social Conflict at Leiden University. Given that 
the content and scope of the contributions are dependent on the offerings of 
conference participants, Schmid and Crelinsten were left acknowledging that the 
French and Swiss experiences may hold some important lessons for all of Europe. 
Unfortunately, French and Swiss participants failed to provide the level of exami-
nation expected on countries significant for, respectively, their experience with 
international terrorists and their roles as neutral logistical bases for terrorists 
operating in other states. Similarly, Western Responses suffers in its focus on 
Western Europe by the noteworthy exclusion of considerations of both the 
Scandinavian and Greek experiences. 
Schmid leads off the volume by defining anti-terrorist response in terms of 
the problems associated with reaching consensus on the definition of terrorism. 
Schmid distinguishes four general categories of discussions on terrorism — 
academic, state or diplomatic, public use, and perpetrators/sympathizers — in 
which perspectives differ to the extent that building consensus across the categories 
may be impossible. Since the inability to develop a workable definition acceptable 
in each area hinders coordinating anti-terrorist policies, Schmid proposes examin-
ing the general models of terrorism. Rather than look at the phenomenon through 
the crime model filter, in which the focus is on the illegality of the act itself, or 
through the filter of the war model, which views terrorism as a form of political 
discourse, Schmid advocates the legal model. By looking at terrorism as the 
peacetime equivalent of war crimes, however, Schmid concedes a willingness to 
conveya sense of legitimacy on the perpetrators of violence which many states have 
been loathe to give. Schmid's argument is confusing at times, especially when 
stating "apparently some hijackings and kidnappings are more terroristic than 
others," (p. 10) and in arguing that there "is a difference between the target of 
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violence and the target of terror" to the extent that "one has to distinguish between 
a common assassination and one in the context of terrorism by labelling the first 
'individuated political murder' and the second 'de-individuated political murder'." 
(p. 11. Emphasis added) Attempts to draw fine distinctions in terrorist violence, 
regardless of the intent, does little more than muddle the discussion by providing 
even greater opportunities to inject value judgments. 
Schmid concludes his initial discussion by suggesting complete Western 
European legal and judicial integration, at least for countering terrorism. 
Schmid writes: 
The European Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism has been 
plagued by the lack of distinction between a 'criminal offence' and a 
'political offence'. By placing narrowly defined acts of terrorism in 
the context of 'war crimes,' the dilemma of contributing a given act 
of violence to the criminal or political sphere disappears. Acts of 
terrorism, like war crimes, could be dealt with by a special European 
tribunal with special jurisdiction on terroristic offences, (p. 13) 
Schmid neglects to consider, however, the willingness or lack of willingness by 
Western European states to give up a measure of sovereignty in pursuit of judicial 
integration. The extent to which some states have jealously guarded their preroga-
tive to distinguish between criminal and political acts when faced with extradition 
requests strongly suggests those same states would be unwilling to allow courts or 
tribunals outside their legal systems and borders to determine issues of guilt and 
punishment for those accused and convicted of terrorist violence. 
Schmid's second contribution begins to deal with the issue of legitimacy. 
Citing the strengths of democratic systems of government, he argues that it is more 
important for a democracy to maintain its own legitimacy than to achieve quick 
tactical success against terrorists while disregarding the most cherished tenets on 
democracy. For Schmid, the choice is between acceptability and effectiveness. The 
greatest danger, he argues, is not from the terrorists themselves but from the 
potential for the state to slip away from democratic practices in the attempt to 
"solve" the problem quickly. The discussion should, perhaps, address the very 
nature of democracy, how it is defined, and who decided its limits. Those who 
define democracy in terms of representative government in which the state is, 
ultimately, a tool of the citizenry's will could have difficulties in accepting 
Schmid's rather rigid view and embrace of the ideals of democracy. 
A.J. Jongman provides a well-written, well-organized discussion of the 
trends in terrorism in Western Europe since 1968. Filled with statistics on attacks 
by targets, numbers, means, and location, Jongman illustrates effectively the 
dangers in not defining terrorism prior to analysis. The figures presented demon-
strate how even slight differences in definition can lead to wide variances in data 
which, in turn, leads to wide disparities in trend assessments. Jongman provides a 
convincing argument for his assertion that trends in terrorist violence are most 
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appropriately viewed in a country-specific context, given data availability and 
definitions used. He continues by demonstrating the variety of trends identifiable 
in Europe since 1968 when the data is examined for each country. The discussion 
suggests, however, that Schmid and Crelinsten's goal of identifying a singular 
European anti-terrorist response model may be more difficult than expected. 
Part two of Western Responses, in general, provides an excellent overview 
of anti-terrorist responses in Western Europe. Some presentations like those on 
France and Switzerland, however, fail to meet expectations, while others present 
only a limited and consequently unbalanced approach. Schmid begins the section 
with a discussion of the Dutch outlook and experience, arguing that there is a 
uniquely Dutch approach to countering societal violence. Based on a pragmatic 
approach to dealing with violence, Dutch tolerance is credited with creating a 
political environment which is not conducive to protest evolution. Schmid 
maintains Dutch history and practices have struck a balance between the ideals of 
democracy and the demands for security. Although he seems to set the Dutch 
experience up as a model for Western Europe, Schmid wisely tempers his conclu-
sion by reminding us that the Netherlands has yet to experience the levels of 
violence other European states have experienced, while cautioning that the Dutch 
approach is largely untested against such a significant challenge. 
The Spanish state has faced such a challenge in attempting to cope with at 
least one terrorist group, Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), which has refused 
to put aside violence despite the state's acceding to longstanding political reforms 
demanded by ETA. Although the conditions allowing political reform came about 
only with the restoration of democracy following the death of Francisco Franco, 
succeeding Spanish administrations have allowed greater regional autonomy and 
other measures designed to meet and defuse the threat offered by ETA and others. 
Fernando Jimenez provides an overview of active groups in Spain, both domestic 
and international, and a summary of the steps taken since Franco to counter the 
challenge. From the Spanish experience, Jimenez offers five guiding principles for 
anti-terrorism efforts: adherence to and accountability under the law; clearly 
defined political objectives for countering the threat; unambiguous, centralized 
chains of command and control for both policy and implementation; a strong and 
centralized intelligence gathering capability; and, the ability to commit to long-term 
planning and action not only to counter the immediate threat, but to resolve and 
prevent those of the future. 
After a very short and disappointing treatment of France, Kurt Groenewold 
provides one of Western Responses more obviously biased examinations in 
presenting a single-sided view of German treatment of suspected and convicted 
terrorists from the Red Army Faction. Groenewold's assessments, however, are 
more easily understood within the context of his association with Germany's 
radical left. A lecturer at Hamburg University, Groenewold obtained first-hand 
insights into the German legal system through his work as a lawyer defending 
anti-Vietnam protestors in the 1960s, and RAF members, including Andreas 
54 
Conflict Quarterly 
Baader and Ulrike Meinhof, in the 1970s. To his credit, Groenewold states his 
bias and perspective up front: 
I am not concerned with the problem of how such groups have been 
or are to be combated by the government, the holder of state authority. 
I am concerned with the question of whether or not the measures taken 
by the Federal government [Federal Republic of Germany] to combat 
captured members of urban guerrilla groups and to bring them to trial, 
plus any supporting measures, are acceptable from the point of view 
of civil liberties and the self-image of the Western constitutional 
democracies, (p. 136) 
Asserting that the trials of RAF members were political trials, Groenewold's 
argument revolves around his perception of the RAF inmates as political prisoners 
rather than as criminals. The very act of putting on a political trial, he claims, serves 
to indict the government for its attempts to stage trials in order to discredit 
government opponents rather than to assess guilt and apply appropriate punishment. 
Groenewold attacks the German penal system for its harsh and inhumane 
treatment of RAF prisoners, arguing that the state sought to degrade its prisoners 
while breaking their personalities and identities. Bemoaning the use of solitary 
confinement as a tool for maintaining positive control, forced feeding of hunger 
strikers, and the German courts' allowance of trials conducted without the 
defendant's presence in some instances. Groenewold fails to ask how much better 
the German state treated its "victims" than the RAF. In the end, Groenewold 
argues the state must conduct itself at the highest standards of democratic ideals, 
yet fails to demonstrate any way in which German terrorists themselves lived up 
to the minimal standards of civilized conduct. Groenewold's analysis is also 
lacking in its focus on events of the 1970s, raising the question of change in the 
1980s and beyond. While the merits of examining past practices for their lessons 
remains valuable in any discussion of future options, Groenewold's one-sided 
presentation, lacking an assessment of any recent changes, only illustrates the 
stridency of impassioned agendas. 
Donatella della Porta, on the other hand, provides a well-balanced assess-
ment of the Italian experience with terrorism. Recognizing four distinct periods 
separating Italian approaches since 1970, della Porta uses the lessons learned to 
shape suggestions for a coordinated European model. Between 1970 and 1974, she 
demonstrates well how the Italian state disregarded the threat of left-wing terrorism 
while suffering from secret service protection of right-wing terrorism. In the second 
period, 1974 to 1976, right-wing terror declined and Italian authorities devoted 
more time and effort to countering and suppressing left-wing terrorism and 
organized crime. Between 1977 and 1982, the previous patterns of Italian response 
led to a period which saw an explosion of left-wing terror coupled with an apparent 
decline of terrorism on the right. In contrast, della Porta argues the policies of 
repentance laws and amnesties contributed to the decline of left-wing terror 
between 1982 and 1989. Using the analysis presented, it is easy to extend della 
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Porta's examination beyond 1989, the year of the AEGEE conference, to explain 
and understand the rapid growth of terrorism perpetrated by rightists and organized 
crime in the early 1990s. Delia Porta's organization and analysis provide valuable 
tools for use in efforts to develop a European response model by illustrating the 
effects, both positive and negative, of a number of Italian responses to a variety of 
threats. Highlighting the negative impact on civil rights brought on by the state's 
policies during the emergenza, uie presentation continues by explaining die steps 
taken to reverse the adverse side-effects of more draconian Italian anti-terrorist 
policies. Delia Porta shows how Italy largely defeated leftist terror of the 1970s 
through changes in the Italian party system, increasing stability in the national 
government, development of coherent and unified political policies, and the focus 
of legislative attempts to counter terror, which recognized the power of psychologi-
cal motivations and inducements designed to address die more basic human needs 
of individuals involved as a means of breaking terrorist group cohesion. In 
highlighting Italian efforts to address group cohesion and terrorist motivations 
through amnesties and reconciliations, della Porta aptly demonstrates how the ideas 
presented by Martha Crenshaw in Terrorism have worked in practice. 
David Bonner approaches the British experience from a legal perspective 
and separates terrorism into three distinct categories: international terrorism; 
domestic terrorism not related to Northern Ireland, and; domestic terrorism con-
nected with Northern Ireland. Focusing on security legislation to deal with Irish-
connected terror, Bonner concludes tiiat only a political solution acceptable to all 
parties involved in Northern Ireland will significantly increase Britain's prospects 
for peace and stability. While agreeing with most contributors in bom Terrorism 
and Western Responses by stating "one must remember tiiat one does not save thç 
liberal state from terrorism by trampling roughshod on its most precious values and 
postulates," (p. 178) Bonner remains largely unapologetic for die security practices 
of the UK. The difference between Bonner's perspective and that of Miller in 
Terrorism is striking. Bonner provides a valuable discussion of various elements 
of British anti-terrorist legislation including proscription; stop, question, and search 
practices in Northern Ireland; attacking financial and logistics sources of terrorist 
groups; evolving investigative powers; wider latitude for arrests and extensions in 
detention without charge; variety of charging choices, and; extradition and extra-
territorial jurisdiction arrangements. While many would criticize Bonner, and the 
British, for advocating security practices open to abuse of democratic ideals, 
Bonner creditably defends British practices by also addressing criteria and methods 
by which anti-terrorist policies can be evaluated for both effectiveness and accept-
ability within the liberal democratic framework. His assessment seems to empha-
size the idea that the rights of the law-abiding members of society are no less 
important than the rights of individuals engaging in violent protest against the state. 
Recognizing die rights of society ' s majority, Bonner draws lessons from the British 
experience which seek to balance die demands of democratic ideals with the rights 
and expectations of society. 
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Schmid and Crelinsten also include an assessment by Gilbert Guillaume of 
the French experience, which could have contributed significantly to the volume if 
expanded, and Albert A. Stahel, highlighting Switzerland's place as a neutral 
ground for rest, financing, and logistics. Heinz Vetschera provides the final country 
assessment by examining Austria's philosophy of rejecting specific anti-terrorist 
legislation in favor of relegating terrorist activities to criminal law statutes. Citing 
this philosophy, Vetschera's main lesson for Europe lies in Austria's having little 
need for high profile security measures. By relying on criminal statutes to deal with 
terrorism in Austria, the state has successfully streamlined its response procedures 
to effectively deal with violent acts, like Britain, as easily identifiable crimes. 
Removing terrorism from the political arena, at least for the purposes of legal and 
judicial response, allows Austria and others to more readily agree on methods of 
countering the challenge posed by terrorism. In this, Vetschera offers what may be 
Europe's best solution to the problem of developing a united anti-terrorist policy, 
while avoiding the potential for abuse provided by state insistence on reserving 
judgment about an act's political nature. 
The final section of Western Responses addresses this desire for a common 
model of European response to terrorism. Focusing on the Schengen Agreement 
and the impact of free movement across inner European borders, Korthals Altes 
highlights the complexity and adaptability required of a coordinated European 
response. As borders become more porous, European states will have to develop 
common practices of controls which will allow the free and unrestricted movement 
of individuals, while providing the mechanisms authorities need to counter terror-
ists' exploitation of European integration. Mechanisms discussed include coordi-
nated visa policies, creation of an integrated computer-based information exchange 
system, standardization of social welfare practices, and increased cooperation by 
police across state boundaries. 
Meliton Cardona expands on the discussion of implementing effective 
coordination by arguing that agreements are often rendered ineffective through 
implementation differences. While the protocols and treaties may suggest high 
degrees of cooperation, implementation clauses allowing states to choose the 
conditions under which they will honor the text, if not the spirit, of the agreement 
provide a significant barrier to effective implementation. Cardona sees potential, 
however, in eventually achieving success in drafting an agreement acceptable to all 
parties and workable if the focus is on smaller, more limited regional agreements 
in contrast to global agreements. In this light, Cardona seems optimistic that Europe 
can develop a workable regional protocol. 
The American perspective on combatting terrorism is addressed briefly by 
Paul Bremer III. Bremer argues in favor of efforts to remove vestiges of legitimacy 
from terrorists as a means of effectively meeting the threat. Bremer also argues, in 
contrast to some other contributors, in favor of pressuring states which sponsor 
terrorism. He continues by assessing specific measures used against terrorists, but 
falters in focusing largely on defensive measures such as airport screenings and 
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physical security without addressing the root causes or motivations of terrorists. 
Limiting responses to physical security, defensive measures, and state sponsors will 
certainly have an impact on the levels of terrorist violence, but remain only 
treatments of the symptoms. A longer view of the threat, its causes, and solutions 
would likely provide insights into effective means of permanent controls. 
Richard Clutterbuck takes a longer view in examining the practice of 
negotiating with terrorists. After providing a summary of notable cases, Clutterbuck 
seeks to determine whether or not governments should negotiate, whether negotia-
tions and concessions lead to further attacks, and whether governments should 
control the situation by prohibiting private negotiations and privately paid ransoms. 
While arguing that governments ultimately do more damage by giving in to 
blackmail, Clutterbuck argues that governments are equally erroneous when they 
adopt firm policies prohibiting negotiations which do not allow for flexibility in 
response to situational specifics. Transposing a firm but flexible response into an 
international agreement raises further problems. Clutterbuck cites the European 
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism (1977) to demonstrate how political 
concessions among states designed to entice additional states to sign the treaty led 
to additional clauses which defeated the treaty's objectives. In the end, the 
Convention retains clauses allowing signatory states to opt out of honoring 
extradition requests at their discretion. Clutterbuck's assessment remains that a 
firm policy is required, but should be tempered with flexibility. While some 
concessions in past instances have, indeed, led to further attacks, Clutterbuck finds 
the pattern cannot be easily generalized across state or situational boundaries. 
Restrictions on private efforts, he argues, are generally counterproductive by 
forcing the businesses, families, and individuals so inclined to negotiate behind the 
backs of state authorities. 
M.P.M. Zagari follows Clutterbuck's presentation by examining the specific 
content of various treaties designed to combat terrorism. Focusing on the 1977 
Convention, the 1978 Dublin Agreement, and efforts of the TREVI (Terrorism, 
Radicalism, Extremism and political Violence) Group and the European parlia-
ment, Zagari highlights the difficulties encountered in achieving agreements among 
states which have similar, but uniquely national perspectives. Extradition has been, 
and will likely remain, a problem for effective cooperation, as will the issue of 
national sovereignty. Zagari writes: 
The process of integration . . . presupposes that the Member States 
recognize the affinity of their political structures and moral values and 
that they recognize one another as partners equal in every sense. It 
follows that a Member State cannot, by invoking the right of asylum, 
refuse a request for extradition from another Member State as this 
would effectively mean that it was claiming greater independence and 
impartiality for its own courts and was setting itself up as more 
respectful of human rights, (pp. 295-96) 
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To counter the problems raised by differences in perspective, Zagari suggests the 
establishment of a common "European Judicial Area" which, by incorporating the 
values and principles of the member states, conceivably could allow European 
authorities to circumvent expected problems arising from different conceptions of 
terrorism's political nature. In Zagari's construction, any time differences between 
states arose as the result of differing perceptions of extraditability or concern for 
human rights guarantees, suspects would be tried before a supranational European 
Court. Like other contributors, however, Zagari fails to adequately consider the 
realities associated with surrender of such measures of state sovereignty. The ideal 
certainly seems agreeable to potential member states, for without such commonality 
none of the present day anti-terrorist agreements would exist. Repeated disagree-
ments over the language of those texts, however, particularly over the right to decide 
whether the offense is in fact an extraditable offense, clearly suggests states would 
be equally unwilling to cede that exercise of sovereignty to a European Court. 
Recognizing the difficulty in coordinating effective international judicial 
and police practices against terrorism, Richard Clutterbuck adds a second contribu-
tion examining practical means for tracking individuals suspected of terrorist 
activities. He notes, first and foremost, that states maintain the right and expectation 
to provide for their own internal security. The free movement of people across 
internal European borders, however, opens a Pandora's box of problems for the 
authorities charged with maintaining that order. Clutterbuck briefly surveys the 
potential technologies available for use in this effort. 
Schmid and Crelinsten bring Western Responses full circle by assessing the 
responses presented by their contributors in an effort to make some suggestions for 
a common European policy which would prove effective without trampling 
democratic ideals. Pointing out that the reality of terrorism includes both elements 
of international terrorism and domestic terrorism, the editors break the various types 
of responses surveyed into workable categories ranging from the softer approaches 
of accommodation and reform to the harder responses based on repressive force. 
Schmid and Crelinsten spend considerable effort in explaining why a military 
response is ultimately ineffective and threatening to the democratic stability of the 
state itself, yet interestingly cite at least one example which also supports military 
responses. In arguing that the military should be an instrument of last resort, 
General George Grivas' statement that "one does not use.a tank to catch field mice 
— a cat will do the job better," is used seemingly in the context of suggesting that 
military responses often attract more terrorist attacks. An alternative interpretation 
would agree that the wisest standing policy would look upon military response as 
a last resort, yet acknowledge the usefulness of such a response if the military's use 
is tempered in me context of the situation. Military response is not, in and of itself, 
irrational. Rather, the overwhelming use of force at inappropriate levels — the 
sledgehammer-to-break-an-egg syndrome — lends the irrational quality to many 
previous uses of military force against terrorists. 
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Schmid and Crelinsten also assess the types of responses not already brought 
out into open discussion by their contributors in order to add a fuller measure of 
consideration to their assessment. Balancing the needs of the state and society 
against both democratic ideals and the demand for effective actions, Schmid and 
Crelinsten write: 
A balance must be struck between the 'delegitimation' of terrorism in 
political life, typical of offensive operations, and leaving open the 
door to those who wish to come back, typical of defensive operations. 
To this end, violence and coercion might not always be the best 
method of coping with terrorism. The more coercive and repressive 
methods might strengthen the terrorist organization and its hold over 
its members. Anti-terrorist strategies might be directed, on the one 
hand, to preventing new recruits from joining terrorist organizations 
and, on the other, to facilitating the exit of older members from 
existing organizations. To achieve this, positive incentives have to be 
created so that, beyond victory and defeat, the conflict can be carried 
on at a different level. Nobody is born a terrorist. Nobody should die 
a terrorist. A dead terrorist is likely to become a martyr and an 
inspiration for further violence, (p. 329) 
This is sound advice, based well on the contributions to the volume. The difficulty, 
as they point out, will lie in achieving the required balance between effectiveness 
and acceptability. Given die competing concerns and debate over the legitimacy of 
terrorist violence and call to create a supra-national forum for dispensing justice 
when two or more states cannot agree, the reality of attaining effective and 
cooperative ideals may prove even more difficult than Western Responses or 
Terrorism suggest. 
Daniel S. Gressang IV 
Bowie, Maryland 
Endnotes 
1. Schmid cites the Chinese saying, "Kill one, frighten ten thousand" in addition to quoting German 
terrorist Hans-Joachim Klein. 
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